Vulnerability Scan Result

IP address | 18.66.218.20 |
Country | US ![]() |
AS number | AS16509 |
Net name | Amazon Inc |
IP address | 18.66.218.46 |
Country | US ![]() |
AS number | AS16509 |
Net name | Amazon Inc |
IP address | 18.66.218.109 |
Country | US ![]() |
AS number | AS16509 |
Net name | Amazon Inc |
IP address | 18.66.218.38 |
Country | US ![]() |
AS number | AS16509 |
Net name | Amazon Inc |
80/tcp | http | Amazon CloudFront httpd - |
443/tcp | https | CloudFront - |
Software / Version | Category |
---|---|
Amazon Web Services | PaaS |
AWS Certificate Manager | SSL/TLS certificate authorities |
Amazon CloudFront | CDN |
HTTP/3 | Miscellaneous |
React | JavaScript frameworks |
Webpack | Miscellaneous |
Affirm 2 | Payment processors, Buy now pay later |
Contentful | CMS |
Gatsby 4.25.7 | Static site generator, JavaScript frameworks |
HSTS | Security |
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Evidence
URL | Evidence |
---|---|
https://zipjob.com/ | Response headers do not include the Referrer-Policy HTTP security header as well as the |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application's server responses lack the Referrer-Policy
HTTP header, which controls how much referrer information the browser will send with each request originated from the current web application.
Risk description
The risk is that if a user visits a web page (e.g. "http://example.com/pricing/") and clicks on a link from that page going to e.g. "https://www.google.com", the browser will send to Google the full originating URL in the `Referer` header, assuming the Referrer-Policy header is not set. The originating URL could be considered sensitive information and it could be used for user tracking.
Recommendation
The Referrer-Policy header should be configured on the server side to avoid user tracking and inadvertent information leakage. The value `no-referrer` of this header instructs the browser to omit the Referer header entirely.
Classification
CWE | CWE-693 |
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
URL | Evidence |
---|---|
https://zipjob.com/ | Response does not include the HTTP Content-Security-Policy security header or meta tag |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application lacks the Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header in its HTTP responses. The CSP header is a security measure that instructs web browsers to enforce specific security rules, effectively preventing the exploitation of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
Risk description
The risk is that if the target application is vulnerable to XSS, lack of this header makes it easily exploitable by attackers.
Recommendation
Configure the Content-Security-Header to be sent with each HTTP response in order to apply the specific policies needed by the application.
Classification
CWE | CWE-693 |
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
URL | Evidence |
---|---|
https://zipjob.com/ | Response headers do not include the X-Content-Type-Options HTTP security header |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application's server responses lack the X-Content-Type-Options
header. This header is particularly important for preventing Internet Explorer from reinterpreting the content of a web page (MIME-sniffing) and thus overriding the value of the Content-Type header.
Risk description
The risk is that lack of this header could make possible attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting or phishing in Internet Explorer browsers.
Recommendation
We recommend setting the X-Content-Type-Options header such as `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
Classification
CWE | CWE-693 |
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
Software / Version | Category |
---|---|
Amazon Web Services | PaaS |
AWS Certificate Manager | SSL/TLS certificate authorities |
Amazon CloudFront | CDN |
HTTP/3 | Miscellaneous |
React | JavaScript frameworks |
Webpack | Miscellaneous |
Affirm 2 | Payment processors, Buy now pay later |
Contentful | CMS |
Gatsby 4.25.7 | Static site generator, JavaScript frameworks |
HSTS | Security |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Classification
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
Vulnerability description
We found the robots.txt on the target server. This file instructs web crawlers what URLs and endpoints of the web application they can visit and crawl. Website administrators often misuse this file while attempting to hide some web pages from the users.
Risk description
There is no particular security risk in having a robots.txt file. However, it's important to note that adding endpoints in it should not be considered a security measure, as this file can be directly accessed and read by anyone.
Recommendation
We recommend you to manually review the entries from robots.txt and remove the ones which lead to sensitive locations in the website (ex. administration panels, configuration files, etc).
Classification
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
Vulnerability description
Website is accessible.
Evidence
Vulnerability description
We have noticed that the server is missing the security.txt file, which is considered a good practice for web security. It provides a standardized way for security researchers and the public to report security vulnerabilities or concerns by outlining the preferred method of contact and reporting procedures.
Risk description
There is no particular risk in not having a security.txt file for your server. However, this file is important because it offers a designated channel for reporting vulnerabilities and security issues.
Recommendation
We recommend you to implement the security.txt file according to the standard, in order to allow researchers or users report any security issues they find, improving the defensive mechanisms of your server.
Classification
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Evidence
Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
---|---|---|---|
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org include:_spf.messagegears.net ~all" |
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 include:sendgrid.net ~all" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the target has more than one configured DNS SPF (Sender Policy Framework) record. SPF is designed to prevent email spoofing by specifying which mail servers are allowed to send email on behalf of a domain. According to RFC 7208, a domain must have only one SPF record. Multiple SPF records can cause validation issues, leading to failed email authentication checks. This could impact email deliverability, and legitimate emails may be rejected or marked as spam.
Risk description
Having multiple SPF records poses a significant risk to email security and deliverability. When a receiving email server encounters more than one SPF record, it might fail to properly validate the SPF configuration, leading to the rejection of legitimate emails or their classification as spam. This can negatively affect business operations by disrupting email communication with customers, partners, or internal stakeholders. Furthermore, failure to comply with SPF best practices can make the domain more vulnerable to email spoofing attacks, which could damage the organization's reputation and lead to phishing attempts using the domain name.
Recommendation
We recommend removing any redundant or conflicting SPF records and ensuring that only one SPF record is present. The multiple records should be merged into a single SPF entry that includes all necessary authorized mail servers. For example, if two SPF records exist, they can be combined into one as follows:\nv=spf1 include:spf1.example.com include:spf2.example.com -all\nAfterward, verify that the single SPF record covers all the intended mail servers. Test the SPF configuration using email testing tools to confirm that it works correctly and that email deliverability is not negatively impacted.
Evidence
Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
---|---|---|---|
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org include:_spf.messagegears.net ~all" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record for the domain is configured with ~all (soft fail), which indicates that emails from unauthorized IP addresses are not explicitly denied. Instead, the recipient mail server is instructed to treat these messages with suspicion but may still accept them. This configuration may not provide enough protection against email spoofing and unauthorized email delivery, leaving the domain more vulnerable to impersonation attempts.
Risk description
The ~all directive in an SPF record allows unauthorized emails to pass through some email servers, even though they fail SPF verification. While such emails may be marked as suspicious or placed into a spam folder, not all mail servers handle soft fail conditions consistently. This creates a risk that malicious actors can spoof the domain to send phishing emails or other fraudulent communications, potentially causing damage to the organization's reputation and leading to successful social engineering attacks.
Recommendation
We recommend changing the SPF record's ~all (soft fail) directive to -all (hard fail). The -all setting tells recipient mail servers to reject emails from any IP addresses not listed in the SPF record, providing stronger protection against email spoofing. Ensure that all legitimate IP addresses and services that send emails on behalf of your domain are properly included in the SPF record before implementing this change.
Evidence
Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
---|---|---|---|
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 include:sendgrid.net ~all" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record for the domain is configured with ~all (soft fail), which indicates that emails from unauthorized IP addresses are not explicitly denied. Instead, the recipient mail server is instructed to treat these messages with suspicion but may still accept them. This configuration may not provide enough protection against email spoofing and unauthorized email delivery, leaving the domain more vulnerable to impersonation attempts.
Risk description
The ~all directive in an SPF record allows unauthorized emails to pass through some email servers, even though they fail SPF verification. While such emails may be marked as suspicious or placed into a spam folder, not all mail servers handle soft fail conditions consistently. This creates a risk that malicious actors can spoof the domain to send phishing emails or other fraudulent communications, potentially causing damage to the organization's reputation and leading to successful social engineering attacks.
Recommendation
We recommend changing the SPF record's ~all (soft fail) directive to -all (hard fail). The -all setting tells recipient mail servers to reject emails from any IP addresses not listed in the SPF record, providing stronger protection against email spoofing. Ensure that all legitimate IP addresses and services that send emails on behalf of your domain are properly included in the SPF record before implementing this change.
Evidence
Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
---|---|---|---|
_dmarc.zipjob.com | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:spfdepot@talentinc.com; ruf=mailto:spfdepot@talentinc.com; fo=1" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DMARC record for the domain is not configured with sp policy, meaning that no policy is enforced for subdomains. When a DMARC record does not include a subdomain policy (sp directive), subdomains are not explicitly covered by the main domain's DMARC policy. This means that emails sent from subdomains (e.g., sub.example.com) may not be subject to the same DMARC enforcement as the main domain (example.com). As a result, attackers could potentially spoof emails from subdomains without being blocked or flagged, even if the main domain has a strict DMARC policy.
Risk description
Without a subdomain policy (sp directive) in the DMARC record, subdomains are not protected by the same DMARC enforcement as the main domain, leaving them vulnerable to spoofing attacks. This inconsistency can be exploited by attackers to send phishing emails from subdomains, undermining the organization’s overall email security.
Recommendation
To mitigate the risk, we recommend configuring the DMARC record with a subdomain policy by adding the sp=reject or sp=quarantine directive. This will extend DMARC enforcement to all subdomains, preventing spoofing attempts and maintaining consistent security across both the main domain and its subdomains.
Evidence
DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
---|---|---|---|
k1 | rsa | 372 | "k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAypRoYtY7Vca7NDFOIj" "+3XwhCqhv6HPRt67mZxBRQt90yDff1Z7d6jaSG03/t39vexwujB0TFRXixb+dwOj5PFD+w8SmoEU0O2VVwYHYO6w49TJdbFXLVBipin5AvkiBlMV0TPeNdWGXbA4Qe8Q" "D8Te/w25kgmbEIhOiz6henhFpLat3EEgW4R3ePu+/0VUcyNjKhXMrn6gg6Jri5vQtn+gxf6avX1m3/HlZnsxJbwNSGV4+2FUX0oFjL8+p+qT6hRZsHONqsvqIOH0m7HhT6so5xKqAOeeKld4EI17YwqO/7t08xT699MX1UefnaRneXgDYpXtAjtkpJSUt/qMF7JQIDAQAB" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM key length is under 1024-bit. When a DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) key length is under 1024-bit, it is considered weak by modern cryptographic standards. Shorter key lengths, such as 512 or 768 bits, are vulnerable to brute-force attacks, where an attacker could potentially forge a valid DKIM signature for a domain. This undermines the entire purpose of DKIM, which is to authenticate email messages and prevent email spoofing by verifying that the message headers have not been tampered with. A DKIM key under 1024 bits significantly reduces the difficulty for attackers to break the signature.
Risk description
The primary risk of using a DKIM key with fewer than 1024 bits is that it weakens the domain's email authentication security, making it more susceptible to brute-force attacks. If an attacker successfully forges a DKIM signature, they can impersonate legitimate senders and send fraudulent or phishing emails that appear authentic to the recipient. This can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and an increased risk of targeted attacks, as recipients are more likely to trust emails that pass DKIM verification.
Recommendation
We recommend using a DKIM key with a length of at least 1024 bits. Ideally, 2048-bit keys should be used, as they provide a higher level of security and are more resistant to brute-force attacks. Organizations should regularly audit their DKIM configurations and rotate cryptographic keys periodically to maintain security. In addition, any DKIM keys that are less than 1024 bits should be immediately replaced with stronger keys to prevent exploitation.
Evidence
DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
---|---|---|---|
default | rsa | 1422 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAn+2w+klw5P9zD6AyQn9OnmWXTs5s0Awo9sr/z01iH0l9DCY9gkBHEhlq6D7siTFTusMGLF5+bCUE3STa4X1LZ1ZQHcgm70Yd9GsEE9E/0Y2RgFJSXH+8ekrOPltNZs+EOa6rTzPySXYleBdmAtmMoheXUpDgZkIdGwW6BFfP4/xY6hLSjoAAp38/zBLrax3kp" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DKIM record uses common selectors. The use of common DKIM selectors such as default, test, dkim, or mail may indicate a lack of proper customization or key management. Attackers often target domains using such selectors because they suggest that the domain is relying on default configurations, which could be less secure and easier to exploit. This can increase the risk of DKIM key exposure or misuse.
Risk description
Using a common DKIM selector makes it easier for attackers to predict and exploit email authentication weaknesses. Attackers may attempt to find corresponding DKIM keys or improperly managed records associated with common selectors. If a common selector is coupled with a weak key length or poor key management practices, it significantly increases the likelihood of email spoofing and phishing attacks.
Recommendation
We recommend using unique, customized selectors for each DKIM key to make it more difficult for attackers to predict and target the domain's DKIM records. Regularly rotate selectors and associated keys to further strengthen the security of your domain's email authentication infrastructure.
Evidence
Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
---|---|---|---|
zipjob.com | A | IPv4 address | 18.66.218.46 |
zipjob.com | A | IPv4 address | 18.66.218.20 |
zipjob.com | A | IPv4 address | 18.66.218.109 |
zipjob.com | A | IPv4 address | 18.66.218.38 |
zipjob.com | NS | Name server | ns-1394.awsdns-46.org |
zipjob.com | NS | Name server | ns-1876.awsdns-42.co.uk |
zipjob.com | NS | Name server | ns-272.awsdns-34.com |
zipjob.com | NS | Name server | ns-763.awsdns-31.net |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 1 aspmx.l.google.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 10 aspmx2.googlemail.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 10 aspmx3.googlemail.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 10 d231058a.ess.barracudanetworks.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 10 d231058b.ess.barracudanetworks.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com |
zipjob.com | MX | Mail server | 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com |
zipjob.com | SOA | Start of Authority | ns-272.awsdns-34.com. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400 |
zipjob.com | TXT | Text record | "google-site-verification=B8mbPbtoSGv5zuUqE_GrkM1OqkySdmy6-ZvOLSUxkqs" |
zipjob.com | TXT | Text record | "google-site-verification=BbWPGhIj3Tb4hcGYdpE2yDOarEG4x5ZdLyH4TLCuDRU " |
zipjob.com | TXT | Text record | "google-site-verification=VYJB5W-wwcRQz-_OvUKf_-BPxZfcrl_DZUoLjMWiY-M" |
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org include:_spf.messagegears.net ~all" |
zipjob.com | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 include:sendgrid.net ~all" |
_dmarc.zipjob.com | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:spfdepot@talentinc.com; ruf=mailto:spfdepot@talentinc.com; fo=1" |
Risk description
An initial step for an attacker aiming to learn about an organization involves conducting searches on its domain names to uncover DNS records associated with the organization. This strategy aims to amass comprehensive insights into the target domain, enabling the attacker to outline the organization's external digital landscape. This gathered intelligence may subsequently serve as a foundation for launching attacks, including those based on social engineering techniques. DNS records pointing to services or servers that are no longer in use can provide an attacker with an easy entry point into the network.
Recommendation
We recommend reviewing all DNS records associated with the domain and identifying and removing unused or obsolete records.
Evidence
Vulnerability description
OS detection couldn't determine the operating system.
Evidence
We managed to detect the redirect using the following Request / Response chain.
Recommendation
Vulnerability checks are skipped for ports that redirect to another port. We recommend scanning the redirected port directly.
Evidence
DKIM selector | Key type | Key size | Value |
---|---|---|---|
default | rsa | 1422 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAn+2w+klw5P9zD6AyQn9OnmWXTs5s0Awo9sr/z01iH0l9DCY9gkBHEhlq6D7siTFTusMGLF5+bCUE3STa4X1LZ1ZQHcgm70Yd9GsEE9E/0Y2RgFJSXH+8ekrOPltNZs+EOa6rTzPySXYleBdmAtmMoheXUpDgZkIdGwW6BFfP4/xY6hLSjoAAp38/zBLrax3kp" |
rsa | 1296 | "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCERR+QyZpinQcWkmuQ5utkOgbDtkHOelSthtVNJGO1YCEIF2/E6uTl2+a5ogoB2KxKBMTEgi8p1hXzTi+7sOZtCPeOFQFjlYTxG19PZ7vyTEIdeGop3ilo2BhU+gkbC39suuhKzJMQ7fpR30KRsNLN/kFUT0hxNLVQIfyqWrogmwIDAQAB" | |
k1 | rsa | 372 | "k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAypRoYtY7Vca7NDFOIj" "+3XwhCqhv6HPRt67mZxBRQt90yDff1Z7d6jaSG03/t39vexwujB0TFRXixb+dwOj5PFD+w8SmoEU0O2VVwYHYO6w49TJdbFXLVBipin5AvkiBlMV0TPeNdWGXbA4Qe8Q" "D8Te/w25kgmbEIhOiz6henhFpLat3EEgW4R3ePu+/0VUcyNjKhXMrn6gg6Jri5vQtn+gxf6avX1m3/HlZnsxJbwNSGV4+2FUX0oFjL8+p+qT6hRZsHONqsvqIOH0m7HhT6so5xKqAOeeKld4EI17YwqO/7t08xT699MX1UefnaRneXgDYpXtAjtkpJSUt/qMF7JQIDAQAB" |
gears | rsa | 1296 | "k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCnnZ67teJIQQLcfbzztAOx7UMJyFVpz29RX1ZlrV9xf5yJDQyCMCHcwcN5qNaqLMr/cuVzkSW3e1vYqO/9lqfXWkXSgYM8kVeywfubh07vNxTia/5pggiiCPD0+wgSgrMqJFDoKzzFAf+wWwidaHQ9Q9Zel0+w9gWmsi56xt7mRwIDAQAB" |
m1 | rsa | 1296 | "k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC4PZZJiwMfMB/CuIZ9yAtNEGzfKzQ7WC7hfGg8UyavtYlDDBgSP6P1AiTBTMzTQbLChvf+Ef5CK46w+RwmgWpL38sxRwjahk45aQxoMOk2FJm7iHnP6zAGUnqAiL8iCdTjn5sp/txNf22bXrx3YS54ePBrfZQxOvkOvE24XZKXXwIDAQAB" |