Vulnerability Scan Result
| Title: | No title found |
| Description: | No description found |
| IP address | 80.74.152.30 |
| Country | CH  |
| AS number | AS21069 |
| Net name | Metanet Ag |
21/tcp | ftp | ProFTPD - |
25/tcp | smtp | Postfix smtpd - |
53/tcp | domain | - - |
80/tcp | http | nginx - |
110/tcp | pop3 | Dovecot pop3d - |
143/tcp | imap | Dovecot imapd - |
443/tcp | https | nginx - |
465/tcp | smtp | Postfix smtpd - |
587/tcp | smtp | Postfix smtpd - |
993/tcp | imap | Dovecot imapd - |
995/tcp | pop3 | Dovecot pop3d - |
2121/tcp | ssh | OpenSSH 7.4 |
3306/tcp | mysql | MySQL 5.5.5-10.6.18-MariaDB-log |
8443/tcp | https | sw-cp-server - |
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| Nginx | Web servers, Reverse proxies |
| iWeb 1.1.2 | Editors |
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://hug-zuschnig.ch/ | Response headers do not include the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security header |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application lacks the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security header in its responses. This security header is crucial as it instructs browsers to only establish secure (HTTPS) connections with the web server and reject any HTTP connections.
Risk description
The risk is that lack of this header permits an attacker to force a victim user to initiate a clear-text HTTP connection to the server, thus opening the possibility to eavesdrop on the network traffic and extract sensitive information (e.g. session cookies).
Recommendation
The Strict-Transport-Security HTTP header should be sent with each HTTPS response. The syntax is as follows: `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=<seconds>[; includeSubDomains]` The parameter `max-age` gives the time frame for requirement of HTTPS in seconds and should be chosen quite high, e.g. several months. A value below 7776000 is considered as too low by this scanner check. The flag `includeSubDomains` defines that the policy applies also for sub domains of the sender of the response.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-693 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://hug-zuschnig.ch/ | Response headers do not include the Referrer-Policy HTTP security header as well as the |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application's server responses lack the Referrer-Policy HTTP header, which controls how much referrer information the browser will send with each request originated from the current web application.
Risk description
The risk is that if a user visits a web page (e.g. "http://example.com/pricing/") and clicks on a link from that page going to e.g. "https://www.google.com", the browser will send to Google the full originating URL in the `Referer` header, assuming the Referrer-Policy header is not set. The originating URL could be considered sensitive information and it could be used for user tracking.
Recommendation
The Referrer-Policy header should be configured on the server side to avoid user tracking and inadvertent information leakage. The value `no-referrer` of this header instructs the browser to omit the Referer header entirely.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-693 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://hug-zuschnig.ch/ | Response headers do not include the X-Content-Type-Options HTTP security header |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application's server responses lack the X-Content-Type-Options header. This header is particularly important for preventing Internet Explorer from reinterpreting the content of a web page (MIME-sniffing) and thus overriding the value of the Content-Type header.
Risk description
The risk is that lack of this header could make possible attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting or phishing in Internet Explorer browsers.
Recommendation
We recommend setting the X-Content-Type-Options header such as `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-693 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
| URL | Evidence |
|---|---|
| https://hug-zuschnig.ch/ | Response does not include the HTTP Content-Security-Policy security header or meta tag |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that the target application lacks the Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header in its HTTP responses. The CSP header is a security measure that instructs web browsers to enforce specific security rules, effectively preventing the exploitation of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
Risk description
The risk is that if the target application is vulnerable to XSS, lack of this header makes it easily exploitable by attackers.
Recommendation
Configure the Content-Security-Header to be sent with each HTTP response in order to apply the specific policies needed by the application.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-693 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| Nginx | Web servers, Reverse proxies |
| iWeb 1.1.2 | Editors |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Classification
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Vulnerability description
We have noticed that the server is missing the security.txt file, which is considered a good practice for web security. It provides a standardized way for security researchers and the public to report security vulnerabilities or concerns by outlining the preferred method of contact and reporting procedures.
Risk description
There is no particular risk in not having a security.txt file for your server. However, this file is important because it offers a designated channel for reporting vulnerabilities and security issues.
Recommendation
We recommend you to implement the security.txt file according to the standard, in order to allow researchers or users report any security issues they find, improving the defensive mechanisms of your server.
Classification
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Evidence
| URL | Method | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| https://hug-zuschnig.ch/ | OPTIONS | We did a HTTP OPTIONS request. The server responded with a 200 status code and the header: `Allow: POST,OPTIONS,GET,HEAD` Request / Response |
Vulnerability description
We have noticed that the webserver responded with an Allow HTTP header when an OPTIONS HTTP request was sent. This method responds to requests by providing information about the methods available for the target resource.
Risk description
The only risk this might present nowadays is revealing debug HTTP methods that can be used on the server. This can present a danger if any of those methods can lead to sensitive information, like authentication information, secret keys.
Recommendation
We recommend that you check for unused HTTP methods or even better, disable the OPTIONS method. This can be done using your webserver configuration.
Classification
| CWE | CWE-16 |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2017 | A6 - Security Misconfiguration |
| OWASP Top 10 - 2021 | A5 - Security Misconfiguration |
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Evidence
| Risk level | CVSS | CVE | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9.8 | CVE-2023-38408 | The PKCS#11 feature in ssh-agent in OpenSSH before 9.3p2 has an insufficiently trustworthy search path, leading to remote code execution if an agent is forwarded to an attacker-controlled system. (Code in /usr/lib is not necessarily safe for loading into ssh-agent.) NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-10009. | |
| 6.8 | CVE-2020-15778 | scp in OpenSSH through 8.3p1 allows command injection in the scp.c toremote function, as demonstrated by backtick characters in the destination argument. NOTE: the vendor reportedly has stated that they intentionally omit validation of "anomalous argument transfers" because that could "stand a great chance of breaking existing workflows." | |
| 6.8 | CVE-2025-26465 | A vulnerability was found in OpenSSH when the VerifyHostKeyDNS option is enabled. A machine-in-the-middle attack can be performed by a malicious machine impersonating a legit server. This issue occurs due to how OpenSSH mishandles error codes in specific conditions when verifying the host key. For an attack to be considered successful, the attacker needs to manage to exhaust the client's memory resource first, turning the attack complexity high. | |
| 6.5 | CVE-2023-51385 | In ssh in OpenSSH before 9.6, OS command injection might occur if a user name or host name has shell metacharacters, and this name is referenced by an expansion token in certain situations. For example, an untrusted Git repository can have a submodule with shell metacharacters in a user name or host name. | |
| 5.9 | CVE-2023-48795 | The SSH transport protocol with certain OpenSSH extensions, found in OpenSSH before 9.6 and other products, allows remote attackers to bypass integrity checks such that some packets are omitted (from the extension negotiation message), and a client and server may consequently end up with a connection for which some security features have been downgraded or disabled, aka a Terrapin attack. This occurs because the SSH Binary Packet Protocol (BPP), implemented by these extensions, mishandles the handshake phase and mishandles use of sequence numbers. For example, there is an effective attack against SSH's use of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (and CBC with Encrypt-then-MAC). The bypass occurs in chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com and (if CBC is used) the -etm@openssh.com MAC algorithms. This also affects Maverick Synergy Java SSH API before 3.1.0-SNAPSHOT, Dropbear through 2022.83, Ssh before 5.1.1 in Erlang/OTP, PuTTY before 0.80, AsyncSSH before 2.14.2, golang.org/x/crypto before 0.17.0, libssh before 0.10.6, libssh2 through 1.11.0, Thorn Tech SFTP Gateway before 3.4.6, Tera Term before 5.1, Paramiko before 3.4.0, jsch before 0.2.15, SFTPGo before 2.5.6, Netgate pfSense Plus through 23.09.1, Netgate pfSense CE through 2.7.2, HPN-SSH through 18.2.0, ProFTPD before 1.3.8b (and before 1.3.9rc2), ORYX CycloneSSH before 2.3.4, NetSarang XShell 7 before Build 0144, CrushFTP before 10.6.0, ConnectBot SSH library before 2.2.22, Apache MINA sshd through 2.11.0, sshj through 0.37.0, TinySSH through 20230101, trilead-ssh2 6401, LANCOM LCOS and LANconfig, FileZilla before 3.66.4, Nova before 11.8, PKIX-SSH before 14.4, SecureCRT before 9.4.3, Transmit5 before 5.10.4, Win32-OpenSSH before 9.5.0.0p1-Beta, WinSCP before 6.2.2, Bitvise SSH Server before 9.32, Bitvise SSH Client before 9.33, KiTTY through 0.76.1.13, the net-ssh gem 7.2.0 for Ruby, the mscdex ssh2 module before 1.15.0 for Node.js, the thrussh library before 0.35.1 for Rust, and the Russh crate before 0.40.2 for Rust. |
Vulnerability description
Vulnerabilities found for Openssh 7.4
Risk description
These vulnerabilities expose the affected applications to the risk of unauthorized access to confidential data and possibly to denial of service attacks. An attacker could search for an appropriate exploit (or create one) for any of these vulnerabilities and use it to attack the system. Notes: - The vulnerabilities are identified based on the server's version.; - Only the first 5 vulnerabilities with the highest risk are shown for each port.;
Recommendation
We recommend you to upgrade the affected software to the latest version in order to eliminate the risks imposed by these vulnerabilities.
Evidence
We managed to detect a publicly accessible SSH service.
Starting Nmap ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-19 06:12 EEST
Nmap scan report for hug-zuschnig.ch (80.74.152.30)
Host is up (0.0044s latency).
Other addresses for hug-zuschnig.ch (not scanned): 2a00:1128:0:152::30
rDNS record for 80.74.152.30: magellan.sui-inter.net
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
2121/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.4 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-auth-methods:
| Supported authentication methods:
| publickey
|_ password
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.75 seconds
Vulnerability description
We found that the SSH service with username/password authentication is publicly accessible. Network administrators often use remote administration protocols to control devices like switches, routers, and other essential systems. However, allowing these services to be accessible via the Internet can increase security risks, creating potential opportunities for attacks on the organization.
Risk description
Exposing this service online with username/password authentication can enable attackers to launch authentication attacks, like guessing login credentials, and potentially gaining unauthorized access. Vulnerabilities, such as unpatched software, protocol flaws, or backdoors could also be exploited. An example is the CVE-2024-3094 (XZ Utils Backdoor) vulnerability.
Recommendation
We recommend turning off SSH with username/password authentication access over the Internet and instead using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that mandates two-factor authentication (2FA). If the SSH service is essential for business purposes, we recommend limiting access only from designated IP addresses using a firewall. Furthermore, it is advisable to utilize SSH Public Key Authentication since it employs a key pair to verify the identity of a user or process.
Evidence
We managed to detect a publicly accessible MySQL service.
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
3306/tcp open mysql MySQL 5.5.5-10.6.18-MariaDB-logVulnerability description
We identified that the MySQL service is publicly accessible. MySQL serves as a common database for numerous web applications and services for data storage, making it a potential prime target for determined attackers.
Risk description
The risk exists that an attacker exploits this issue by launching a password-based attack on the MySQL service. Furthermore, they could exploit zero-day vulnerabilities to obtain remote access to the MySQL database server, thereby gaining complete control over its operating system and associated services. Such an attack could lead to the exposure of confidential or sensitive information.
Recommendation
We recommend turning off public Internet access to MySQL and opting for a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that enforces two-factor authentication (2FA). Avoid enabling direct user authentication to the MySQL service via the Internet, as this could enable attackers to engage in password-guessing and potentially initiate attacks leading to complete control. However, if the MySQL service is required to be directly accessible over the Internet, we recommend reconfiguring it to be accessible only from known IP addresses.
Evidence
We managed to detect a publicly accessible File Transfer Protocol (FTP) service.
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp ProFTPDVulnerability description
We found that the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) service is publicly accessible. The FTP enables client systems to connect to upload and download files. Nonetheless, FTP lacks encryption for the data exchanged between the server and the client, leaving all transferred data exposed in plaintext.
Risk description
Exposing this service online can enable attackers to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, capturing sensitive user credentials and the contents of files because FTP operates without encryption. The entirety of the communication between the client and the server remains unsecured in plaintext. This acquired information could further facilitate additional attacks within the network.
Recommendation
We recommend turning off FTP access over the Internet and instead using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that mandates two-factor authentication (2FA). If the FTP service is essential for business purposes, we recommend limiting access only from designated IP addresses using a firewall. Furthermore, utilizing SFTP (Secure File Transfer Protocol) is recommended as this protocol employs encryption to secure data transfers.
Evidence
We managed to detect a publicly accessible Post Office Protocol (POP3) service.
Starting Nmap ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-04-19 06:12 EEST
Nmap scan report for hug-zuschnig.ch (80.74.152.30)
Host is up (0.0043s latency).
Other addresses for hug-zuschnig.ch (not scanned): 2a00:1128:0:152::30
rDNS record for 80.74.152.30: magellan.sui-inter.net
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
995/tcp open ssl/pop3 Dovecot pop3d
|_pop3-capabilities: PIPELINING SASL(PLAIN LOGIN DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5) CAPA USER RESP-CODES UIDL APOP AUTH-RESP-CODE TOP
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 6.87 seconds
Vulnerability description
We found that the Post Office Protocol (POP3) service is publicly accessible and doesn’t include STARTTLS capability. Email clients use the Post Office Protocol (POP) to download emails for user accounts. Some POP servers are initially set up to operate over an unsecured protocol. When email clients download email content through this plaintext protocol, it can pose a substantial risk to the organization's network, especially depending on which user account is set to receive the emails.
Risk description
Exposing this service online can enable attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, thereby gaining access to sensitive user credentials and the contents of emails. Given that POP3 operates via a plaintext protocol, the entirety of the data exchanged between the client and server is left unencrypted. This critical information could then be leveraged in further attacks on the organization's network.
Recommendation
We recommend turning off POP3 access over the Internet and instead using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that mandates two-factor authentication (2FA). If the POP3 service is essential for business purposes, we recommend limiting access only from designated IP addresses using a firewall. Furthermore, activating STARTTLS capability (switching the connection to a secure communication) or utilizing Secure POP3 (POP3S) is recommended, as this protocol employs encryption.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| _dmarc.hug-zuschnig.ch | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=none" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the target uses p=none in the DMARC policy. The DMARC policy set to p=none means that the domain owner is not taking any action on emails that fail DMARC validation. This configuration effectively disables enforcement, allowing potentially spoofed or fraudulent emails to be delivered without any additional scrutiny.
Risk description
Emails that fail DMARC checks are still delivered to recipients. This leaves the domain highly vulnerable to email spoofing and phishing attacks, as malicious actors can impersonate the domain without facing any consequences from DMARC enforcement.
Recommendation
We recommend changing the DMARC policy to p=quarantine or, ideally, p=reject to actively block or quarantine emails that fail DMARC validation. This will enhance the security of your domain against spoofing and phishing attacks by ensuring that only legitimate emails are delivered.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| _dmarc.hug-zuschnig.ch | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=none" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DMARC record for the domain is not configured with sp policy, meaning that no policy is enforced for subdomains. When a DMARC record does not include a subdomain policy (sp directive), subdomains are not explicitly covered by the main domain's DMARC policy. This means that emails sent from subdomains (e.g., sub.example.com) may not be subject to the same DMARC enforcement as the main domain (example.com). As a result, attackers could potentially spoof emails from subdomains without being blocked or flagged, even if the main domain has a strict DMARC policy.
Risk description
Without a subdomain policy (sp directive) in the DMARC record, subdomains are not protected by the same DMARC enforcement as the main domain, leaving them vulnerable to spoofing attacks. This inconsistency can be exploited by attackers to send phishing emails from subdomains, undermining the organization’s overall email security.
Recommendation
To mitigate the risk, we recommend configuring the DMARC record with a subdomain policy by adding the sp=reject or sp=quarantine directive. This will extend DMARC enforcement to all subdomains, preventing spoofing attempts and maintaining consistent security across both the main domain and its subdomains.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| _dmarc.hug-zuschnig.ch | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=none" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DMARC record for the domain is not configured with rua tag. When a DMARC record is not configured with the rua (Reporting URI for Aggregate Reports) tag, the domain owner misses out on critical feedback regarding the domain's email authentication performance. Aggregate reports are essential for monitoring how a domain's DMARC policy is applied across various mail servers and whether legitimate or malicious emails are being sent on behalf of the domain. Without this reporting, domain administrators have no visibility into how their DMARC policy is being enforced, which hinders their ability to detect potential spoofing or authentication issues.
Risk description
The absence of rua reporting creates a significant blind spot in the domain's email security posture. Without aggregate reports, domain administrators cannot track DMARC compliance across email sent from their domain, leaving them unaware of potential misconfigurations or unauthorized use of their domain for malicious purposes, such as phishing or spoofing. This lack of visibility increases the risk of undetected spoofing attempts, which could damage the domain's reputation and lead to financial, operational, or reputational harm. Moreover, legitimate email issues, such as misaligned SPF or DKIM configurations, may also go unnoticed, affecting email deliverability.
Recommendation
We recommend configuring the rua tag in the DMARC record to receive aggregate reports from mail servers. This tag should point to a reliable email address or monitoring service capable of handling DMARC aggregate reports, such as rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com. These reports provide valuable insights into how email from the domain is being treated by receiving mail servers, highlighting potential authentication issues and attempts to spoof the domain. Regularly reviewing these reports will help ensure the DMARC policy is properly enforced and that any email authentication failures are addressed in a timely manner.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| _dmarc.hug-zuschnig.ch | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=none" |
Vulnerability description
We found that the DMARC record for the domain is not configured with ruf tag. A missing ruf (forensic reporting) tag in a DMARC record indicates that the domain owner has not enabled the collection of detailed failure reports. Forensic reports provide valuable insights into specific instances where emails fail DMARC authentication. Without the ruf tag, the domain administrator loses the ability to receive and analyze these reports, making it difficult to investigate individual email failures or identify targeted phishing or spoofing attacks that may be exploiting weaknesses in the email authentication setup.
Risk description
Without forensic reports (ruf), domain owners have limited visibility into the specifics of failed DMARC validation. This means potential malicious activity, such as email spoofing or phishing attempts, might go unnoticed until they result in more significant security breaches or reputational damage. Forensic reports allow for quick response to email abuses by providing detailed information about the failure, including the header information of the emails involved. The absence of this data hampers an organization's ability to identify and mitigate threats targeting its domain, increasing the risk of ongoing spoofing and fraud.
Recommendation
We recommend configuring the ruf tag in the DMARC record. This tag specifies where forensic reports should be sent, providing the domain owner with detailed data on DMARC validation failures. Forensic reports allow administrators to analyze why certain emails failed authentication, making it easier to fine-tune DMARC policies or address potential vulnerabilities. Ensure that the ruf email address belongs to a secure and trusted location capable of handling sensitive email data.
Evidence
We checked 2056 selectors but found no DKIM records.
Vulnerability description
We found that no DKIM record was configured. When a DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) record is not present for a domain, it means that outgoing emails from that domain are not cryptographically signed. DKIM is a critical component of email authentication, allowing recipients to verify that an email was genuinely sent from an authorized server and that the message has not been altered in transit. The absence of a DKIM record leaves the domain vulnerable to email spoofing and phishing attacks, as attackers can send fraudulent emails that appear to originate from the domain without any cryptographic verification.
Risk description
Without a DKIM record, recipients have no way of verifying the integrity or authenticity of emails sent from the domain. This increases the likelihood of phishing and spoofing attacks, where malicious actors impersonate the domain to send fraudulent emails. This can lead to significant security incidents, such as credential theft, financial fraud, or the distribution of malware. Additionally, many email providers use DKIM as part of their spam and reputation filters, meaning that emails from a domain without DKIM may be flagged as spam or rejected, impacting the deliverability and reputation of legitimate emails.
Recommendation
We recommend implementing DKIM for your domain to enhance email security and protect your brand from email-based attacks. Generate a DKIM key pair (public and private keys), publish the public key in the DNS under the appropriate selector, and configure your email servers to sign outgoing messages using the private key. Ensure that the DKIM key length is at least 1024 bits to prevent cryptographic attacks. Regularly monitor DKIM signatures to ensure the system is functioning correctly and update keys periodically to maintain security.
Evidence
We managed to detect that MySQL has reached the End-of-Life (EOL).
Version detected: 5.5.5-10.6.18-mariadb-log End-of-life date: 2020-04-11 Latest version for the cycle: 5.5.68 This release cycle (5.5) does have long-term-support (LTS). The cycle was released on 2012-04-11 and its latest release date was 2020-05-06.
Risk description
Using end-of-life (EOL) software poses significant security risks for organizations. EOL software no longer receives updates, including critical security patches. This creates a vulnerability landscape where known and potentially new security flaws remain unaddressed, making the software an attractive target for malicious actors. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, disrupt services, or steal sensitive data. Moreover, without updates, compatibility issues arise with newer technologies, leading to operational inefficiencies and increased potential for system failures. Additionally, regulatory and compliance risks accompany the use of EOL software. Many industries have strict data protection regulations that require up-to-date software to ensure the highest security standards. Non-compliance can result in hefty fines and legal consequences. Organizations also risk damaging their reputation if a breach occurs due to outdated software, eroding customer trust and potentially leading to a loss of business. Therefore, continuing to use EOL software undermines both security posture and business integrity, necessitating timely upgrades and proactive risk management strategies.
Recommendation
To mitigate the risks associated with end-of-life (EOL) software, it's crucial to take proactive steps. Start by identifying any EOL software currently in use within your organization. Once identified, prioritize upgrading or replacing these applications with supported versions that receive regular updates and security patches. This not only helps close security gaps but also ensures better compatibility with newer technologies, enhancing overall system efficiency and reliability.Additionally, develop a comprehensive software lifecycle management plan. This plan should include regular audits to identify upcoming EOL dates and a schedule for timely updates or replacements. Train your IT staff and users about the importance of keeping software up to date and the risks associated with using outdated versions. By maintaining a proactive approach to software management, you can significantly reduce security risks, ensure compliance with industry regulations, and protect your organization's reputation and customer trust.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| hug-zuschnig.ch | A | IPv4 address | 80.74.152.30 |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | NS | Name server | ns2.magellan.sui-inter.net |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | NS | Name server | ns1.magellan.sui-inter.net |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | MX | Mail server | 10 mail.hug-zuschnig.ch |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | SOA | Start of Authority | ns1.magellan.sui-inter.net. admin.hosting-swiss.ch. 2023012806 10800 3600 604800 10800 |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | AAAA | IPv6 address | 2a00:1128:0:152::30 |
| hug-zuschnig.ch | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 -all" |
| _dmarc.hug-zuschnig.ch | TXT | Text record | "v=DMARC1; p=none" |
Risk description
An initial step for an attacker aiming to learn about an organization involves conducting searches on its domain names to uncover DNS records associated with the organization. This strategy aims to amass comprehensive insights into the target domain, enabling the attacker to outline the organization's external digital landscape. This gathered intelligence may subsequently serve as a foundation for launching attacks, including those based on social engineering techniques. DNS records pointing to services or servers that are no longer in use can provide an attacker with an easy entry point into the network.
Recommendation
We recommend reviewing all DNS records associated with the domain and identifying and removing unused or obsolete records.
Evidence
Vulnerability description
OS detection couldn't determine the operating system.
Evidence
| Domain Queried | DNS Record Type | Description | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| hug-zuschnig.ch | SPF | Sender Policy Framework | "v=spf1 -all" |
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| iWeb 1.1.2 | Editors |
| Nginx | Web servers, Reverse proxies |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| iWeb 1.1.2 | Editors |
| Nginx | Web servers, Reverse proxies |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.
Evidence
| Software / Version | Category |
|---|---|
| Plesk | Hosting panels |
| Sentry | Issue trackers |
| Nginx | Web servers, Reverse proxies |
| React | JavaScript frameworks |
| RequireJS | JavaScript frameworks |
| Prototype | JavaScript frameworks |
| React Router 6 | JavaScript frameworks |
| core-js 3.38.1 | JavaScript libraries |
| Sectigo | SSL/TLS certificate authorities |
Vulnerability description
We noticed that server software and technology details are exposed, potentially aiding attackers in tailoring specific exploits against identified systems and versions.
Risk description
The risk is that an attacker could use this information to mount specific attacks against the identified software type and version.
Recommendation
We recommend you to eliminate the information which permits the identification of software platform, technology, server and operating system: HTTP server headers, HTML meta information, etc.